

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

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10 May 1966  
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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY-THIRD MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 10 May 1966, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

(Italy)

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## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS Mr. D. SILVEIRA da MOTA
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. C. LUKANOV Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV Mr. D. POPOV Mr. D. KOSTOV
<u>Burma:</u>	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. E.L.M. BURNS Mr. S.F. RAE Mr. C.J. MARSHALL Mr. P.D. LEE
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. T. LAHODA Mr. V. VAJNAR Mr. C. CEBIS
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. A. ABERRA Mr. A. ZELLEKE Mr. B. ASSFAW
<u>India:</u>	Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI Mr. K.P. LUKOSE Mr. K.P. JAIN
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. F. CAVALLETTI Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI Mr. S. AVETTA Mr. F. SORO
<u>Mexico:</u>	Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. O.O. ADESOLA

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. B. KLJJDY  
Mrs. M. COSMA-KOLEPANIEJCZEW

Romania:

Mr. N. ECOBLESCU  
Mr. C. UNGUREANU  
Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden:

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD  
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN  
Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKY  
Mr. G.K. EFIMOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALILAF  
Mr. A. OSMAN  
Mr. M. KASSEM  
Mr. A.A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Lord CHALFONT  
Sir Harold BEELEY  
Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON  
Mr. M.J.F. DUNCAN

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER  
Mr. S. DePALMA  
Mr. D.S. MACDONALD  
Mr. A. NEIDLE

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. O. FREY

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): I declare open the two hundred and sixty-third plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. TRIVEDI (India): Today is the last meeting of our Committee before we recess for about a month, and it is appropriate that we address ourselves to the subject which has been the principal item debated during the twenty-nine meetings we have held so far -- non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Our Committee functions in the framework of the international climate, and our strength and utility as well as our weakness and shortcomings depend on the extent to which we reflect that climate. It is incumbent upon us, therefore, to consider the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as other problems of disarmament, in the context of international thinking and the guidelines laid down by the international community.

The widespread public interest in the problem of proliferation has been a somewhat recent development. In the past, either in the context of the danger posed by the nuclear menace or separately, countries such as Ireland, Sweden and India had brought up this issue in the United Nations, but it was mainly after the explosion of a nuclear weapon device by the People's Republic of China in October 1964 that the question aroused general and public interest. The Chinese action was widely condemned by all the peace-loving peoples of the world. In its anti-social arrogance the People's Republic of China exploded a second nuclear weapon device in May 1965, while the Disarmament Commission was actually in session. And now, only yesterday, China gave new radioactive evidence of its hostility to peace and disarmament and its expansionist and militarist ambitions, once again placing the entire human society as well as the generations yet unborn under far-reaching hazards of health and thermo-nuclear holocaust.

It is essential that our Committee and the international community should consider the implications of these repeated acts of defiance of the will of humanity and damage to its well-being. It is necessary that we devote ourselves with energy and determination to the task of preventing this real and blatant proliferation and deal with the fundamental problem of the menace of current proliferation. This cannot be done, however, by an attitude of moral indignation, sorrowful frustration or cynical acquiescence, or by putting forward ineffectual and superficial remedies for some future contingencies. The problem of present as well as future proliferation is undoubtedly urgent, and it is becoming more urgent with these periodic and annual explosions. At the same time, a sense of urgency should not lead to panic, for measures devised hastily in an atmosphere of panic are often unwise and unjust.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

One of the most gratifying features of the situation has been the steady and rational evolution in the thinking of the international community on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Ever since the birth of these dreadful weapons statesmen of many nations have emphasized time and again that the highest priority should be given to the question of halting and reversing the nuclear arms race. As far as India is concerned, it has always urged that the central problem of peace and security and of disarmament is the nuclear arms race, and that it is not fruitful to deal with the consequences of the arms race unless that central problem is dealt with. Nine years ago Jawaharlal Nehru said in the Indian Parliament:

"We have declared quite clearly that we are not interested in making atom bombs even if we have the capacity to do so, and that in no event will we use atomic energy for destructive purposes. I am quite sure that when I say this I represent every member of this House. I hope that will be the policy of all future Governments. The fact remains that, if one has these fissionable materials and if one has the resources, then one can make a bomb, unless the world will be wise enough to come to some decision to stop the production of such bombs."

Whether in the context of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or in the wider framework of disarmament, India has thus urged upon the international community that it is essential to deal urgently with the main problem of the nuclear arms menace, and particularly with the vital problem of halting and reversing the nuclear arms race; for the only efficacious solution is to deal with the cause along with the consequences of the malaise. India voted for what is called the Irish resolution (A/RES/1665 (XVI)), but in explaining its vote and in putting forward its reservations it said that the resolution did not go far enough. India supported what is called the Undén Plan and voted for the Swedish resolution (A/RES/1664 (XVI)), which called for an enquiry to be made into the conditions under which non-nuclear weapon countries and nuclear weapon countries might agree to non-proliferation and non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

India has remained constant in its national determination to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. At the same time it is aware that, in order to arrive at an international agreement and to obtain an international treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it is necessary to stop proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects -- that is, actual and present proliferation by the nuclear weapon Powers themselves, and possible or future proliferation by the non-nuclear weapon countries.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

In this context the Indian delegation was greatly impressed with the profound statement on disarmament problems contained in the Swedish Government's declaration on foreign policy made in Parliament by the Foreign Minister of Sweden on 23 March. This statement merits close study and a constructive response from all concerned, and I should like to quote some relevant extracts from it:

"The question of non-proliferation is thus a problem extending outside the exclusive sphere of interest of the great Powers. It is those countries which do not possess nuclear weapons but which can produce them that are requested to relinquish their option in the interest of general security; and, in principle, we can agree so far. But, for sound reasons, it can in addition be maintained that the present expansion and improvements of existing nuclear stockpiles also involve a continuously increasing danger to peace.

"If the general security of the world shall be the guideline of the efforts to gain control over the possession of nuclear weapons, then the great Powers must also obviously put a limit to their nuclear armaments. A non-proliferation agreement not paying reasonable regard to this demand can be difficult to accept for several of the countries which are of considerable importance in this connexion -- namely, those which now are more or less close to the point where they are able to start their own production of nuclear weapons. Without the co-operation of these countries, a non-proliferation agreement cannot be efficient. There is cause to regret that so far the great Powers have shown themselves disinclined to consider sufficiently the viewpoints of the non-aligned nations in this important respect.

"As to the Swedish point of view, we are positive to the efforts to bring about an effective agreement against further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such an agreement presupposes universal accession attainable only through 'an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers', to use the wording of the United Nations resolution (A/RES/2028)(XX). Therefore Sweden supports in Geneva the demands of the non-aligned nations that the great Powers shall give their contribution in the form of a complete test ban and the discontinuance of the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes.

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"When we set these demands we do not mean, of course, that we shall start production of nuclear weapons if our demands are not fulfilled. Such a decision has no political actuality in this country. When we insist on commitments in return, this is due to the fact that we want an agreement which constitutes an efficient contribution to the limitation of the nuclear threat in the sense of the United Nations resolution".

In considering these issues the Committee should constantly bear in mind that the international community has been defining with progressive precision what should constitute the basic elements of an adequate treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It gives an incomplete picture, therefore, when some people talk of the United Nations and refer to only one of the two general resolutions of 1961 and not to a specific and detailed resolution of 1965, or when they talk of the position of the non-aligned countries and refer to the memorandum of September 1965 (ENDC/158) -- often misquoting it -- but not to the historic General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) sponsored by those non-aligned delegations. We should not forget that the world community as a whole has demonstrated in international documents the sure and unmistakable evolution in its thinking on the subject of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that the final and firm views of the United Nations have found their rational expression in the specific principles laid down in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX).

References have been made in our Committee to an article-by-article examination of the two draft treaties (ENDC/152, 164) which were presented before the drafting and adoption of this resolution. This is undoubtedly a useful and constructive procedure, but it is even more essential to conduct initially a principle-by-principle examination of United Nations General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX). As I said earlier, our Committee necessarily has to function in the framework of the international climate and international directives, and this historic resolution of the twentieth session of the United Nations represents the inescapable demand of the international community as a whole. The principles laid down in this resolution are not those of only the non-aligned nations or the aligned nations, not those of only the nations of a particular region or continent, but of the entire world society, and it is inappropriate for this Committee to ignore them. When the General Assembly of the United Nations is reconvened in September this year, that august body will be

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concerned primarily with how we have implemented its resolution on the subject and how faithful we have remained in our discussions to the guide-lines given to us in that resolution.

As the non-aligned delegations in the Committee have pointed out, the most important principle laid down by the United Nations is that the treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon Powers. It needs to be emphasized that, out of the five principles laid down by the international community in this resolution, only this particular principle stipulates specifically what should be embodied in an acceptable treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons -- that is, what should be in the body of the treaty. The treaty must therefore have specific provisions and articles in its text which would provide an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear weapon Powers and the non-nuclear weapon Powers.

The United Nations has not accepted the thesis that this treaty should by its nature be discriminatory, that it is not a measure of disarmament, that it should embody principally the obligations and responsibilities of the non-nuclear weapon countries, and that as far as the nuclear weapon countries are concerned they need only attempt to negotiate measures balancing the obligations of the non-nuclear weapon countries separately, in the hope that they may reach some agreement on them some time in the future.

As I said earlier, the United States and the Soviet Union presented their draft treaties before the adoption of the General Assembly resolution, with its firm and clear principles. Since then both delegations have advanced some amendments or proposals of amendment. The Indian delegation has already welcomed the proposal made in Chairman Kosygin's message of 1 February (ENDC/167), and would like to take this opportunity of welcoming the message from His Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia, circulated to the Committee on 1 March in the context "of the fact that the present nuclear possession and proliferation could be a serious danger to the security of mankind...". (ENDC/171).

The Indian delegation also welcomes the amendment put forward by the United States delegation defining rationally the status of the countries concerned and using the expressions "nuclear weapon States" and "non-nuclear weapon States" (ENDC/152/Add.1). I am personally grateful to the United States delegation for its handsome and generous acknowledgment (ENDC/PV.250, pp. 7, 8) of my modest contribution in that behalf.



(Mr. Trivedi, India)

Those are some wholesome developments and deserve to be praised. In particular, the Indian delegation believes that they indicate a welcome receptiveness on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union delegations; it hopes that in the same approach or understanding they will soon introduce other amendments so as to reflect the directives given to all of us by the United Nations in its resolution 2028(XX).

Principle 2(b) of that resolution talks of the responsibilities and obligations of non-nuclear weapon countries and of nuclear weapon countries. As far as the non-nuclear weapon countries are concerned, the two draft treaties before us set out their obligations and their responsibilities. First, there is the question of dissemination, pure and simple. The drafts provide, in principle, that the non-nuclear weapon countries shall not receive weapons or weapon technology. Secondly, there is the question of the production of nuclear weapons; and the drafts stipulate that the non-nuclear weapon countries shall not manufacture these weapons. Thirdly, a suggestion has been made for some kind of control on the peaceful activities of nations. It is true that article III in the United States draft (ENDC/152, p.2) is only a statement of an objective to be attained, although a preambular statement of that type could properly find its place only in the preamble of the treaty, rather than in a substantive article. Nevertheless, some statements have been made which seem to indicate that the imposition of such control is believed to be an important feature of an international instrument on non-proliferation.

The United Nations resolution says that all obligations should apply mutually to the nuclear weapon Powers as well and that they should be balanced as between the non-nuclear weapon countries and the nuclear weapon countries. It goes further and says that the balanced and mutual obligations of the nuclear weapon Powers should be embodied in the treaty. This requirement is clearly spelt out in the resolution and cannot be ignored.

If we look at the two drafts, however, we find -- presumably because they were presented before the adoption of the United Nations resolution -- that the principle of balance and mutuality is reflected only in the first set of obligations: those relating to dissemination proper. Just as the non-nuclear weapon Powers are required not to receive weapons and weapon technology, the nuclear weapon Powers are required not to give them. This certainly provides balance and mutuality in the body of the treaty.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

Incidentally, apart from the controversy between the two alliances on the exact definition of what constitutes the giving or receiving of weapons and weapon technology, there is another aspect of this problem which needs to be attended to. The transfer of weapons and weapon technology should be considered not only in relation to transactions between the nuclear weapon Powers on the one hand and the non-nuclear weapon Powers on the other, but also among the nuclear weapon Powers themselves. This is a point which India made as early as 1961. It means that transfer of nuclear weapons and technology should be prohibited even if it involves transfer from one nuclear weapon Power to another nuclear weapon Power.

Despite this lacuna, and despite the controversy on the definition of the contours of dissemination, the two drafts embody in principle the mutuality and balance enjoined upon us by the international community. When we come to the other two sets of obligations, however, we find that there is as yet no provision to reflect the requirements of the United Nations resolution. As far as production is concerned, it is only the non-nuclear weapon countries which are directed not to manufacture nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapon Powers retain the right to continue to manufacture these dread weapons of destruction. That provides no balance and no mutuality. This lacuna is particularly calamitous when one considers the case of the People's Republic of China, an incipient nuclear weapon Power, a Power which does not as yet have either a stockpile of nuclear weapons or a developed system of delivery. The drafts as they stand would give it a licence to develop its stockpile and its delivery systems. They would permit such a country to proliferate at will under the umbrella of an inadequate treaty.

Leaving aside individual cases, however, the fact remains that the United Nations resolution demands balance and mutuality as between non-nuclear weapon countries and nuclear weapon countries. The Indian delegation has noted with satisfaction that the Swedish delegation made a concrete proposal in that respect on 10 March (ENDC/PV.247, p.14), and it endorses the suggestion that the very first article of an acceptable treaty on non-proliferation should prohibit the production of fissile material for weapon purposes to all countries alike, nuclear weapon Powers and non-nuclear weapon Powers, in accordance with the principle of mutuality and balance. The other articles can then follow in a rational and coherent sequence.

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The Indian delegation is aware that the United States delegation has referred at several meetings to the question of cessation of such production. In implementation of United Nations resolution 2028 (XX), however, this requirement has to be embodied in the treaty itself. The Indian delegation hopes that this will be done in the near future so that the Committee can express itself in detail on the actual terms of the article in question.

There is yet another aspect of the balance which needs to be embodied in the treaty, and this arises from the existence of the awesome arsenals of the existing nuclear weapon Powers. There is no balance nor security if these over-kill stockpiles continue even at their present hazardous levels. Several delegations have devoted their attention to this problem, and in particular the Indian delegation is impressed with the suggestion in that respect made to the Committee by the delegation of the United Arab Republic on 3 March (ENDC/PV.245, p.15). The treaty should thus embody an article providing for a legal obligation on the part of the nuclear weapon Powers to reduce their stocks in an acceptable manner. As Ambassador Khallaf said, this should be a formal and firm indication.

The Indian delegation believes that, if the first article of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons covers the problem of production and the second article the problem of dissemination, the third article should provide for an obligation for reduction of stockpiles. This is not a preambular matter but a substantive one, and needs to be embodied in the substantive articles of the treaty. Other subsidiary articles, like the withdrawal clause and the one on the coming into force of the treaty, could then follow these basic articles.

Finally, there is the question of control on the peaceful nuclear activities of nations. India has always maintained that control and disarmament should be simultaneous and that it is not possible to isolate the two concepts. What is even more important in the context of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is that any measure we envisage should be mutual and balanced. It should leave no loopholes, as enjoined in principle 2(a) of resolution 2028 (XX); and in accordance with principles 2(b), (c) and (d) of that resolution it should apply in particular to the armed activities of nations.

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If, therefore, any control is to be envisaged in a treaty of this nature -- and that is another issue -- it should first apply equally and without any discrimination to all nuclear facilities of all nations and not only to the facilities of non-nuclear nations or developing nations; and secondly, it should apply to the peaceful activities of nations as well as their warlike activities. As India has stated several times in the past, nuclear weapons are fabricated by the nuclear weapon Powers with the fissile material produced by them in their gaseous diffusion plants. They are not manufacturing these weapons in their atomic reactors or in their atomic power plants, and it is no use controlling the semi-finished product while leaving the finished product completely uncontrolled. The most essential facility to be controlled, therefore, is the gaseous diffusion plants.

In this Committee, unlike other organizations and agencies, we are discussing only the issues of disarmament, and as far as we are concerned it is our obligation to deal specifically with these issues. At any rate, the directives given to us by the United Nations resolution are that a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should leave no loop-holes which might permit either the nuclear weapon Powers or the non-nuclear weapon Powers to proliferate nuclear weapons in any form; that the body of the treaty should provide for an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of nuclear weapon Powers and non-nuclear weapon Powers; and that the treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and particularly of nuclear disarmament.

The Indian delegation believes it necessary to emphasize that it lays special stress on the resolution of the United Nations, not so much because that resolution represents the combined and overwhelming opinion of the international community on the subject as because the principles laid down in it have a universal validity and represent the fundamental verities of the situation. Again, the sovereign, equal and independent nations of the world desire that an international treaty should be non-discriminatory.

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But that is not the main emphasis of the resolution. Its main emphasis is that an international instrument on non-proliferation must ensure security for all and should safeguard not only the interests of countries which are militarily aligned with the nuclear weapon Powers, but also the interests of the non-aligned nations -- in fact, the interests of the entire world society. It was with this supreme consideration in mind that the United Nations adopted resolution 2028 (XX) by a massive vote.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): In preparation for the resumption of our debate on the question of non-proliferation, I have reviewed the discussions which have recently taken place in this Committee. Today I shall comment further on some of the points raised by the representative of the Soviet Union. In doing so I shall attempt to state as clearly as I can the United States position on certain fundamental aspects of the non-proliferation problem. I believe it is important at this stage of our work that there should be no misunderstanding of these fundamental aspects, nor of the position of the United States.

Mr. Roshchin has criticized the approach of the United States in a number of ways. First, he has alleged that the United States intention to retain its veto over the firing of its nuclear weapons somehow proves United States assent to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. That is simply not so. As we have pointed out over and over again, the United States intends to maintain control over its own nuclear weapons. The President of the United States has said so, the Secretary of State has said so, the Secretary of Defense has said so, and I have said so repeatedly. There can be no doubt on this score. However, the Soviet Union apparently remains unsatisfied.

In an effort to make clear our intentions, we have introduced into our draft non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/152 and Add.1) precise provisions. This Committee is familiar with these clauses of our draft treaty -- articles I, II and IV -- and there is thus no need to recite them again. What they say, in effect, is the following: no one -- I repeat, no one -- will be able to fire United States weapons unless the United States decides that they are to be fired. This is the situation which now obtains, and we have no intention whatsoever of changing it.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

We have talked a great deal about this question of whether a country can fire nuclear weapons. The reason for this is obvious. The purpose of any weapon, unfortunately, is to fire it or to threaten to fire it. So long as the effective decision to use nuclear weapons is left in the hands of an existing nuclear weapon State, there is no proliferation. To ensure the effective control of the United States over the firing of its own nuclear weapons, my Government has made great efforts and has gone to considerable expense to develop and apply complex codes and electronic devices which prevent any unauthorized action.

We all hope, as earnestly as it is possible to hope for anything in this world, that it will never be necessary to fire nuclear weapons. However, if such a day should ever arrive, it will be the United States and not some other country which will decide whether United States weapons are to be fired.

I wish now to take up a second line of argument presented by the Soviet delegation. On 5 April Mr. Roshchin made the charge that, instead of discussing specific provisions of a non-proliferation treaty, we were "being involved in the intricacies of the internal relations within NATO which it is said will control the use of nuclear weapons by the members of this bloc" (ENDC/PV.255, p.19). He proceeded to conclude that this was apparently necessary in order to obtain agreement to the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty which would permit proliferation of these weapons within this military bloc of the Western Powers (ibid.).

It should not be necessary to belabour the obvious. However, when the Soviet representative makes such a charge, frank and plain words are necessary. With regard to this line of argument, I wish to stress one point in particular. The United States -- and I believe I can speak for its allies as well -- does not plan to seek the approval of the Soviet Union for carrying out any plans for nuclear defence which we and our allies may deem to be necessary. It is therefore not appropriate for the Soviet Union or other States outside the NATO alliance to become involved in the intricacies of the internal relations within NATO.

It is also not necessary because the United States has stated over and over again that any arrangements for nuclear defence in NATO will not involve the proliferation of its nuclear weapons. By this I mean that in the process of carrying out any arrangements we contemplate, or as a result of such arrangements, participating States

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will not get from us their own nuclear weapons; nor will they acquire an independent right or ability to fire nuclear weapons. This is in accordance with firm United States policy and legislation which rule out the possibility of proliferation. The historical experience of over twenty years has confirmed that we have lived up to these requirements. In addition, we now propose a non-proliferation treaty which would reinsure this result. Once such a treaty comes into force, there will be a firm international basis for ensuring that nuclear defence arrangements in NATO do not involve proliferation of nuclear weapons to any of the participants.

There is a third line of argument of the Soviet Union which I wish to discuss. On several occasions the Soviet representative has stated that the security of the Soviet Union and other communist States, as well as of the non-aligned nations, cannot be based on some agreements which exist or may exist within the framework of NATO. Specifically on 29 March Mr. Roshchin said that the Soviet Union could not base its "security on the United States right to enter a 'veto' when decisions are taken in NATO on questions relating to the use of nuclear weapons". (ENDC/PV.252, p.9)

This argument is unhelpful because it distorts and confuses reality. We fully understand what the security of the Soviet Union is based upon. Like the security of the United States, the security of the Soviet Union is based upon weapons and forces which are believed to be sufficient to deter aggression and to protect vital interests. Beyond this, of course, both the Soviet Union and the United States depend for their security on the self-restraint, judgement and wisdom which are brought to bear on the international scene by both sides. We are not asking the Soviet Union to base its security on intra-NATO agreements. That would be absurd. The Soviet Union can rest assured, none the less, that the NATO alliance is strictly defensive and that aggression will never be its aim.

In estimating our strength to deter aggression, a very important factor for the United States is the strength of its allies and the common plans and purposes within the alliance. To provide for our common defence, we and our allies have had to undertake co-operative activities in the field of nuclear defence; but these activities do not and will not involve giving to any non-nuclear weapon participants their own nuclear weapons. We have considered and discussed possible additional arrangements for nuclear defence with our allies because their co-operation is important to us and we have confidence that they share with us common aims and aspirations.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

We must assume that the Soviet Union has also had to work out some forms of co-ordinated nuclear defence with its allies. We have pointed out that it seems apparent that the Soviet Union also trains with its allies in the use of delivery vehicles capable of using nuclear weapons. Our hope is that Soviet arrangements have the same reliable safeguards against proliferation as those which we have insisted upon in any defence arrangements in which we participate. It is worth noting again, however, that we have not yet received any satisfactory answer to our question whether such Warsaw Pact arrangements are regarded by the Soviet Union as constituting proliferation.

That is an important point. It is in fact possible for an alliance to be the setting for proliferation of nuclear weapons. Regrettably, in the Sino-Soviet alliance assistance was at first given by the Soviet Union to the communist Chinese, who only yesterday conducted a third nuclear explosion in continued defiance of the nuclear test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1). Of course, this assistance in the spread of nuclear weapons may now be regarded with some dismay by those who granted it; but they have no basis for imputing an intention to the United States to disseminate nuclear weapons.

I have spoken in plain terms of certain basic concepts because I believe that we have unfortunately been caught up in debaters' points. For example, it is only a debater's point to charge, as the representative of the Soviet Union did in our meeting on 28 April, that the United States has taken a step backward by failing to incorporate a concept of control which was utilized in a completely different context some twenty years ago (ENDC/PV.260, pp.4 et seq.). As everyone is aware, the United States was proposing at that time to place under international control the entire technology of the atom, both peaceful and military. Instead of attempting to score debaters' points we must focus much greater attention on basic concepts, on underlying realities. It would be tragic if we failed to close the door to proliferation in time because we had kept ourselves busy with an abstract argument about the number of loop-holes that might be imagined in this or that treaty clause.

The principal reality which the Soviet Union seems bent on ignoring relates to the nature of alliances, and the NATO alliance in particular. This alliance was formed and is being maintained by its members because of the existence of a



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powerful threat against them. This is a threat which they did not provoke and which includes hundreds of Soviet nuclear weapons ready for employment against the territory of Western Europe. The NATO countries have a vital interest and naturally wish to participate in the nuclear defence which is a deterrent against that threat. The United States is willing to work out with its allies nuclear defence arrangements, not involving proliferation, which will result in their having responsible and meaningful roles in their own nuclear defence.

The Soviet Union has said in effect that the non-nuclear NATO countries cannot participate in training involving the effects of nuclear weapons, in decisions regarding the deployment of nuclear weapons, in decisions regarding strategy, and so forth. However, the Soviet Union surely recognizes that the responsible arrangements pursuant to which these activities take place will continue as long as they are deemed necessary. Moreover, they will have to be adapted as necessary to changing circumstances. The question arises, therefore, why the Soviet Union has chosen to present increasingly extreme positions in our discussions of this matter. It certainly does not facilitate the negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty.

For two years now the Soviet Union has persisted in its efforts to complicate our task of halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons by means of a campaign against NATO and the Federal Republic of Germany. We all know the way in which this is intended to serve Soviet foreign policy objectives in Europe, but what does it have to do with the proliferation of nuclear weapons?

During this period existing NATO nuclear arrangements have remained in force. Other proposed arrangements have been under discussion; but no new arrangements, apart from continuing efforts to improve consultations, have as yet been implemented. But neither has a non-proliferation treaty been concluded. Such a treaty, which is the proper concern of this Committee, not only would halt the world-wide proliferation of nuclear weapons but would also establish the framework within which any NATO arrangement would have to fit.

Unless we find a way out of the present impasse, all of us, including the Soviet Union, stand to lose. And we shall not be able to chart our way out of this impasse by ignoring realities. That perhaps is the most important point I wish to emphasize today. I sincerely hope that it will be possible for all of us, when during the recess we review our position, to come to appreciate the great issues at

(Mr. Foster, United States)

stake and the need to deal with those issues in a direct, fair and realistic manner. I also hope that we all come to recognize the urgency of our task. The realities of the present situation will not soon change, let alone disappear. If we procrastinate we stand a very good chance of missing completely the opportunity of concluding a non-proliferation treaty.

Nor should we miss opportunities to make progress in other areas which will contribute importantly to our over-all non-proliferation objective. In these areas my delegation has sought to make constructive contributions. We have submitted detailed suggestions on the means of verifying a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons (ENDC/PV.256, pp.12 et seq.). We have elaborated on the means of verifying the destruction of nuclear weapons (ibid.). We have described some feasible new methods of verifying a comprehensive test-ban treaty (ENDC/PV.254, pp.16 et seq.). The practical procedures we have presented result from a continuous effort by my Government, including its utilization of the talent of the most skilled specialists available in our country, inside and outside the Government. We are trying to find practical avenues of progress in solving the difficult problems which confront us.

Our suggestions are not and have not been presented on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. They are illustrative suggestions designed to help our work. We would hope that other delegations would study them during the recess and perhaps make suggestions of their own when we resume our work. I refer particularly to those delegations which have underscored the importance of collateral measures related to non-proliferation.

For our part we shall continue to study the interesting suggestions regarding means of facilitating progress toward a ban on all nuclear tests which have been made by the delegations of Sweden (ENDC/PV.256), the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.259) and Mexico (ENDC/PV.246). Although some aspects of these suggestions do not coincide with our own positions, we nevertheless recognize these suggestions as serious contributions designed to advance the work of this Committee.

My delegation has also sought to make contributions to our work in other fields. We have elaborated (ENDC/PV.257, pp.15 et seq.). President Johnson's proposal concerning regional limitations in the field of conventional armaments (ENDC/165, p.3). The guidelines which I have set forth are intended as a stimulus

(Mr. Foster, United States)

to constructive initiatives. We appreciate that such initiatives cannot emerge overnight. However, the processes of study, exploration, consultation can begin. We sincerely hope they will, and we stand ready to be of every possible assistance.

I should like now to refer to a major initiative having relation to arms control which has been announced by the President of the United States. On 7 May this year the President proposed conclusion of a treaty to govern exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies. The proposed treaty should ensure that explorations of the moon and other celestial bodies will be for peaceful purposes only. As the President has indicated, no country should be permitted to station weapons of mass destruction on a celestial body. Nor should weapon tests or military manoeuvres be permitted. In addition we want to ensure that our astronauts and those of other nations can freely conduct scientific investigations of the moon. We want the results of these activities to be available to all mankind. The President said:

"I am convinced that we should do what we can -- not only for our generation, but for future generations -- to see to it that serious political conflicts do not arise as a result of space activities."

The United States is seeking early discussions on this proposal in the appropriate United Nations body.

I should like to recall that one of our members in this Committee has made an important contribution to this initiative. In June 1963 the delegation of Mexico submitted in this Committee specific suggestions (ENDC/98) to accomplish the same purposes which President Johnson has urged in his recent proposal. We appreciate the foresight and wisdom which have characterized the action of the Government of Mexico in this regard.

But our priority task in this Committee remains the negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty. In the stocktaking and analysis which should take place during the forthcoming recess every member of this Committee can be assured that the United States seeks and will continue to seek with all possible determination and speed a fair and effective non-proliferation treaty. We shall not be discouraged by ill-concealed efforts to weaken or embarrass the NATO alliance. And we shall not be side-tracked by deceptive distortions of our proposals and intentions or those of our allies. We shall maintain our determination and our optimism, because the fundamental realities with which we are concerned must be recognized ultimately.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

The seriousness and urgency of our task in negotiating a non-proliferation treaty must be appreciated. When that happens I believe that this Committee will then devote its time and efforts in earnest to the negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty. And this, I am confident, will be a fair and effective treaty -- a treaty which will contribute greatly to the security of us all.

Mr. ROSENCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

Today the ninth session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament comes to an end. In accordance with established custom we should like to analyse in a very general way the work accomplished by the Committee and to sum up the results of the session which is now ending.

The Committee had before it extremely important recommendations by the United Nations General Assembly and also proposals submitted by States members of the Committee both on questions of general and complete disarmament and on collateral measures in the field of disarmament, including the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is upon the achievement of progress in such an important sphere as the problem of disarmament that the future trend of international events depends -- whether towards a further deterioration of the world situation, or towards a lessening of tension and the settlement of other urgent outstanding questions. That is why public opinion in many countries is following the work of the Committee with great attention in the expectation of positive steps by the Committee in solving the questions before it.

When speaking of the results of the work of this session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, we must first of all characterize the international situation in which this session has been held. In this connexion we must point out that, as a result of the aggressive policy of the United States, there has been a perceptible increase in international tension. The war which is being waged by the United States against the people of Viet-Nam and which constitutes a serious threat to peace in Asia and to world peace is obviously having a negative effect on the efforts of all people of goodwill to achieve a solution to outstanding international problems, including disarmament problems. The war in Viet-Nam is undoubtedly having a definitely negative effect on the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee and its efforts to solve the problems before it.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

It is also necessary to refer to the dangerous development of events in Western Europe, where the Federal Republic of Germany, with the support of the United States, is increasingly pursuing the course of resuscitating militarism and revanchism. The Potsdam Agreements, which provided for joint efforts by the anti-Hitler coalition Powers against the rebirth of German militarism and Nazism, have in fact been laid aside by the United States and the United Kingdom. West Germany has been transformed into a vast military arsenal crammed with atom bombs, missiles, shells and mines. The West German Bundeswehr has become one of the biggest NATO armies in equipment and numbers.

All the designs and aspirations of the ruling circles of the Federal Republic of Germany are focused on obtaining access to nuclear weapons, by means of which they intend to carry out their plans for revenge. That is why Bonn is incessantly taking the initiative in continuing the negotiations to set up a NATO multilateral nuclear force, and this is preventing the solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Thus in Europe, where during the lifetime of a single generation two world wars have broken out in the first half of this century, a hotbed fomenting the danger of war is again being created. In this connexion can it be forgotten that a conflict in Europe, where the armed forces of NATO and of the Warsaw Treaty confront each other, would have the direst consequences for all countries and peoples and for the cause of peace as a whole?

The favourable trend towards a lessening of international tension which was to be observed a few years ago and which found expression in the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space (ENDC/100/Rev.1), and also in a certain limitation of the arms race, has been frustrated by the political policy of the United States in Asia and in Europe. The arms race in the United States and in certain Western countries has again begun to spiral steeply upwards, and the already swollen military arsenals of States continue to be replenished with weapons of mass destruction of truly unlimited power and range.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

All this, of course, could not fail to affect the work of the present session of the Committee. At the same time these circumstances required of the members of the Committee the utmost efforts and perseverance in order to overcome the difficulties standing in the way of the accomplishment of the tasks assigned to it and to make progress in working out agreements in the field of disarmament and arms limitation which could be the starting-point for an improvement in the international situation.

Attaching great importance to the problem of disarmament, the Soviet Union has made considerable endeavours to help to bring about a solution to the problems of general and complete disarmament and also of collateral measures aimed at halting the arms race. It is our profound conviction that the cause of peace and international security depends to a considerable extent on the solution of these problems. The need for an immediate solution of the disarmament problem was stressed again in the message (ENDC/167) from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Kosygin, to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, setting forth a programme of measures in the field of disarmament the implementation of which is advocated by the Soviet Union.

As is well known, the Soviet Union has submitted for consideration by the Committee a concrete draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/164). This draft treaty is pervaded from beginning to end by an endeavour to close all doors and all loop-holes to the direct and indirect proliferation of nuclear weapons. It fully corresponds to the aim set before all States by resolution 2028 (XX) of the General Assembly concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/161).

Furthermore, the Soviet Union has proposed consideration of a whole series of other concrete and urgent measures the implementation of which would really lead to a slowing-down of the arms race, the alleviation of international tension, and the deliverance of the peoples from the threat of nuclear war. The delegation of the Soviet Union has proposed, in particular, that agreement be reached on an immediate solution of the problem of the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries (ENDC/167). This has long been demanded by the peoples of many countries of the world, since there is no doubt that the implementation of this measure would substantially strengthen the security and sovereignty of States and would place considerable obstacles in the way of the accomplishment of aggressive acts.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

Guided by the well-known resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, we have also vigorously urged the implementation of such important measures as the establishment of denuclearized zones in various areas of the world and the prohibition of underground nuclear tests. We have also advocated the achievement of an agreement to ban the use of nuclear weapons, and have proposed that, before the achievement of such an agreement, the nuclear Powers should agree among themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons (ibid.).

In putting forward its programme of individual measures in the field of disarmament, the Soviet Union does not regard them as an end in themselves the achievement of which would permit a halt to be made, but as steps towards the main goal --- general and complete disarmament under strict international control. The Soviet Union has therefore proposed that the examination of the question of general and complete disarmament in the Committee should be continued, since it considers the agreeing of a treaty on general and complete disarmament to be one of the basic tasks of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

In order really to put an end to the danger of a nuclear war and to the nuclear arms race, the Soviet Government has proposed consideration of the question of the immediate implementation of a programme of nuclear disarmament, bearing in mind that such disarmament must provide for the destruction, under appropriate international control, of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons accumulated by States, the prohibition of the manufacture of such weapons, the complete destruction of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, and the prohibition of the manufacture of such vehicles (ibid.).

In putting forward its programme in the field of disarmament, the Soviet delegation has at the same time kept in mind that it is ready to study and consider without prejudice the proposals of any other delegation aimed at advancing the cause of disarmament.

The broad programme advocated by the Soviet Union of constructive and realistic measures aimed at ridding the peoples of the threat of nuclear war has received during this session the fullest support from the delegations of the socialist countries members of the Committee. These delegations in their turn have put forward a number of extremely important and useful proposals designed to limit the arms race and strengthen European security. In this connexion, mention must be made of the proposal of the

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

Polish People's Republic to establish a denuclearized zone in Central Europe (ENDC/C.1/1) and to freeze nuclear arms in that area (ENDC/PV.189, p.6). We should also like to recall that the Government of the German Democratic Republic, in a special message to the Committee (ENDC/168), called upon the nuclear Powers, in so far as they have nuclear weapons on German soil, to withdraw these nuclear weapons from German territory and in future to keep it free of nuclear weapons. At the same time the Government of the German Democratic Republic solemnly declared that it was ready to enter into a commitment on the renunciation of nuclear weapons provided that the Federal Republic of Germany expressed the same readiness.

It should be noted that extremely important and noteworthy proposals on certain urgent questions relating to the elimination of the threat of nuclear war and the improvement of the international situation have been put forward at the current session by the representatives of the non-aligned countries. We also note with satisfaction that in their statements the representatives of the non-aligned countries have spoken of the need to adopt a number of measures designed to eliminate the danger of war; these measures have been supported by the USSR and the other socialist countries.

Despite, however, the efforts of the socialist countries and also of the non-aligned States, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at this session has again been unable to achieve any positive results. In fact, the United States and its supporting partners in the NATO military-political bloc have not given the Committee a chance to make any progress.

In regard to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United States has put forward its concept of so-called "limited proliferation" of such weapons, a concept expressed both in the old (ENDC/152) and the new (ENDC/152/Add.1) United States draft treaties. This concept, which is in absolutely blatant contradiction with the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on this question, is based on the assumption of the possibility of transferring nuclear weapons to non-nuclear countries and of establishing joint nuclear forces in military blocs. In short, it is based on the assumption of the possibility of direct and indirect proliferation of nuclear weapons which would be limited merely by the right of veto of the nuclear Powers over the firing of such weapons.



(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

In his statement today the United States representative, Mr. Foster, has endeavoured to sidetrack and dispute all the arguments which we have advanced in the meetings of the Committee against the United States Draft treaty on non-proliferation. He stated that the United States treaty ensured non-proliferation. He stated that NATO members would not get nuclear weapons into their control. But a mere statement is utterly inadequate. This statement needs to be corroborated by realistic grounds and, in particular, by the draft treaty on non-proliferation which we are discussing here.

The United States representative said nothing to explain the fact that the word "control" and the concept of "control" in the United States draft treaty are defined in such a curtailed and limited way that they are altogether inadequate to prevent proliferation. He still has not proved to us why the right of veto over the use of nuclear weapons is needed in the United States draft treaty. There is no such right of veto in our proposal on non-proliferation. There should be no place for such a right in a treaty of this kind. If it appears as an integral part of the treaty, it assumes as a consequence that non-nuclear Powers will get nuclear weapons, will possess them, will control them and will be able to fire them, subject to only one limitation -- the right of veto. Obviously this is not the answer we expected from the representative of the United States. The answer which has been given to us here merely strengthens our firm conviction that the United States draft treaty is inadequate for the purpose which this document sets itself: to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The representative of the United States did not touch upon the third argument we put forward against the United States proposal: that the United States treaty provides for the possibility of transforming a nuclear Power into an association of nuclear States, when instead of one nuclear Power there could be five, six or fifteen States possessing nuclear weapons. How is it possible, logically, to justify in a non-proliferation treaty such a blatant and obvious proliferation of nuclear weapons? We have not been given any explanation of that in the past, nor have we been given any throughout the work of this session of the Committee.

In reply to our statement that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, as well as the non-aligned countries, cannot base their security on some agreements which exist within NATO, the United States representative stated: "Yes, the security of the Soviet Union must be based on weapons and forces, but the very reason why we are sitting here and discussing matters is to ensure security by means of international agreements". But the international agreement, the draft treaty which has been submitted to us by the United States, does not bring about this security. That is the crux of the matter.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

The United States representative asked how the Soviet draft treaty was to be regarded and whether it adequately provided for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. After all, the members of the Warsaw Treaty also have certain reciprocal relations with the Soviet Union and some relation to nuclear weapons. Here we must repeat the statement which we have already made on many occasions: that our treaty has been agreed with all the countries of the Warsaw Treaty, and that therefore answers that part of the question.

Another reply which we should like to hear from the United States representative is how in his opinion our treaty is likely to contribute to proliferation. We have pointed out three important and essential elements. The first question is that of "control" which does not ensure control, although the United States representative pleaded that in 1946-1947 control pursued different aims. We agree that control pursued different aims, but the concept did not consist in that curtailed, restricted formula which is given to the word "control" in the United States draft treaty. As the second element we put forward the right of veto, which shows that proliferation is involved. As the third element we put forward the question of the possibility of transforming or converting a nuclear Power into an association of nuclear States. Here are three clear and obvious pointers which testify to the existence of elements of proliferation provided for in the United States treaty.

We have not heard from the United States representative what elements, in his opinion, there are in our draft treaty which would contribute to proliferation and contradict the resolution of the General Assembly on this question. Consequently the reproaches and doubts which have been put forward in regard to our draft treaty and our relations with the Warsaw Treaty countries have not been corroborated in any way in the statement of the United States representative.

The United States representative has said that we should not interfere in the internal affairs of NATO, that this does not, strictly speaking, come within our competence, that it is sufficient to declare that NATO exists, that NATO is a realistic alliance to be reckoned with, which we cannot avoid here and which we are bound to take into account. We must say in reply to this that we recognize the reality and existence of NATO, but that we do not recognize that within the framework of a non-proliferation treaty NATO members should have nuclear weapons. And certainly in this sphere we may touch upon the problems of NATO as such. We cannot evade them, because the United States draft treaty itself provides for the possibility of proliferation within the framework of military alliances. That is why we must consider NATO from the standpoint of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the extent that non-proliferation

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

is concerned. It is precisely the draft treaty submitted by the United States that compels us to consider this problem. If we failed to consider it, we should be by-passing a very important clause, a very important provision laid down in the United States draft.

Those are our preliminary comments on the statement of the United States representative which we deem it appropriate to make at the present meeting. In concluding our comments, we should merely like to mention that we have not received the answers which we awaited. I should like to say that from our point of view the explanations given by the representative of the United States concerning the United States draft treaty and our objections have not added anything to our understanding of the state of affairs which has now come about in regard to the discussion of the United States draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

With regard to other collateral measures aimed at the limitation of armaments, the United States and the other Western Powers have in fact evaded even the consideration of the relevant proposals put forward by the Soviet Union. Thus they have categorically opposed the proposal for the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops from the territories of other countries, thus showing that they intend in future to use these bases as a springboard for conducting military operations against other States and as an instrument for exercising influence on their policies. The United States has ignored the important General Assembly resolution concerning the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons (A/RES/1653(XVI)), thus endeavouring to keep for itself freedom of action in the use of such weapons. The United States and its NATO partners have not given a positive answer to the proposal of the Polish People's Republic, supported by the other socialist countries, to establish a denuclearized zone in Central Europe and to freeze nuclear arms in that area, although the need for the establishment of such a zone in the most dangerous area of the world is obvious.

By insisting -- despite the opinion of eminent scientists in many countries, including the United States -- on so-called on-site inspection, the United States has created an artificial obstacle in the way of a solution to the problem of the prohibition of underground nuclear tests. In fact, the United States has shown that it is not seeking the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of underground tests and that its aim has been and still is to continue an extensive programme of such tests in order to improve existing nuclear weapons and to create new types.

In the discussion of general and complete disarmament in the Committee at this session, the reluctance of the United States and the other Western States supporting that country to solve the fundamental questions relating to general and complete

disarmament has been clearly revealed. The United States, with the support of the other Western countries represented in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, continues as before to insist on retaining till the end of the disarmament process a considerable quantity of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and refuses to decide in principle the question of the unconditional prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. As a result it has to be noted that there is stagnation and even an impasse in the negotiations on this important problem.

We should now like to make some comments on the statement made by the United Kingdom representative, Lord Chalfont, at the meeting of the Committee held on 5 May in defence of the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany against our allegedly unjust attack on the militaristic and revanchist course taken by that country. In connexion with his description of our approach to that problem as "myopic" and "doctrinaire" (ENDC/PV.262, p.5), we must say that the position of the United Kingdom in regard to German revanchism and militarism and to the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons cannot in any way be described as far-sighted and realistic. We well know the result of such a position of the ruling circles of the United Kingdom in regard to German militarism and revanchism in the thirties of this century after Hitler came to power, when he openly broke all undertakings concerning the limitation of German armaments. The so-called "far-sighted" and "flexible" approach of the ruling circles of the United Kingdom cost mankind many tens of millions of human lives and caused the peoples untold suffering.

We lay bare the dangerous course of the West-German militarists so that such mistakes will not be repeated and the great sacrifices of the peoples in the Second World War will not have been in vain. One can only be astonished that the Munich spirit still exists in the ruling circles of the United Kingdom and that the lessons of history have had no proper effect on them. Surely they cannot fail to realise that the weapons to which they are striving so hard to ensure access by the West German Bundeswehr will threaten the United Kingdom as much as the other countries of Europe -- and not only Europe. The assertion by the United Kingdom representative that our approach allegedly hampers progress in solving the problem of non-proliferation is absolutely unfounded and contrary to the most obvious facts.

Lord Chalfont devoted a considerable part of his statement at the last meeting of the Committee to a eulogy of the United States proposals for a cut-off in the production of fissile material and some reduction of its quantity (ibid., pp.6 et seq.). He has raised this question at this late hour in the Committee's work and has even tried to insist on something like priority for the consideration of these proposals. In this connexion we should like to put a question, likewise at a somewhat late hour. What is the position of the United Kingdom on a whole number of measures such as a substantial

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

reduction in military expenditures, implementation of the General Assembly resolution concerning the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and many other proposals put forward by the socialist countries that have received the broad support of an overwhelming number of States?

Lord Chalfont merely touched in passing on the question of the elimination of bases in foreign territories, which in his opinion does not merit attention. Yet there is the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the elimination of foreign military bases in colonial territories (A/RES/2105(XX)). This resolution clearly has priority over the United States proposals. Then why did the United Kingdom representative not consider it possible to give to his and many other vitally important questions the attention they deserve?

That, briefly, is the unsatisfactory situation in the Committee in regard to the consideration of fundamental questions which are de facto on its agenda. The situation in the Committee, which is largely a reflection of the existing world situation, is bound to cause concern and anxiety. In order to get out of the impasse there must be further efforts, initiative and, of course, determination to overcome the extremely grave existing difficulties in solving the problems of disarmament as well as other international problems.

In summing up the unsatisfactory results of the present session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee as a whole, it would of course be incorrect to say that it has been altogether useless. As we have already said, during the session proposals have been put forward which are of definite interest and deserve careful study. A further useful element in our work has been the fact that, in the course of discussion both of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of other problems, the positions of the various parties have been clarified and we have ascertained what lies at the basis of the fundamental divergencies among members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on various disarmament questions. All this makes it possible to visualize more clearly the situation in which the negotiations are involved, the reasons preventing progress, and the prospects for the negotiations both with regard to the problem of disarmament as a whole and to individual aspects of this problem.

Today the delegations of the Eighteen-Nation Committee are parting for the recess. It has been agreed that the Committee will re-assemble in five weeks' time. We hope that the recess will be used by the members of the Committee to ponder once again on the situation which has come about with regard to consideration of the disarmament problem, and to prepare new steps with a view to resolving the impasse on a problem which has been awaiting solution for many years.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) (translation from French): The discussions at this session are coming to an end, and the Polish delegation would like to take this opportunity to put forward its views on some of the problems on which our Committee has worked. An assessment of the results of our discussions is bound, unfortunately, to lead us to the conclusion -- and apparently we shall not be alone in this assessment -- that the Committee has made no progress towards an agreement on the problems which we are called upon to solve. We should not hide from public opinion this negative assessment of the concrete results of our work; on the contrary, we should note that the Committee has been faced with an impasse and that the persistence of this state of affairs may have serious repercussions on the very future of the discussions on disarmament.

It must be admitted that this session has been held in unfavourable circumstances. We have been witnesses of an increase in international tension, in particular as a result of the war of aggression carried on by the United States in Viet-Nam. Despite declarations of peaceful intentions, and even proposals for the opening of talks, the United States is extending its operations of war against the people of Viet-Nam. We are not working in isolation, as has been so well stated today by the representative of India, Mr. Trivedi. On the contrary, we are aware of the thousands of ties which unite us internationally. This Committee is, as it were, a sensitive instrument which registers all the fluctuations of the international situation; our debates necessarily reflect all events, both positive and negative. Unfortunately it is the latter which have recently been foremost in the international scene.

Where we ourselves are concerned, we shall not tire of repeating that the continuation of the cold war, the application of a policy based on position of strength in its most brutal form, can only increase tension and destroy mutual confidence; certainly that is not the way to create favourable conditions for an agreement in the field either of collateral measures or of general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

The subject which has dominated our discussions during the present session of our Committee has been the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We have considered two draft treaties: the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/164) and the United States draft treaty (ENDC/152 and Add.1). In evaluating these two drafts the Polish delegation has based itself on resolution 2028(XX) of the United Nations General Assembly, which lays down the conditions to be fulfilled by an agreement on non-proliferation. As we know, paragraph 2(a) of this resolution provides that -

"The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form". (ENDC/161)

The Polish delegation considers that only the Soviet draft fulfils this condition. By the obligations which it lays upon both nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, this draft fills any gap which might permit non-nuclear countries to gain access to atomic weapons. Unfortunately the same cannot be said of the United States draft or of the amendments which have been made to it during the present session. In our opinion the United States draft contains loop-holes which make possible indirectly the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which, as we know, is intended to enable the Federal Republic of Germany to gain access to atomic weapons.

During the discussion which has taken place at this session we have been criticized for considering this question from a specifically European angle and for neglecting the importance of this problem to other continents. I have already had the opportunity in my previous statement to explain our point of view on this subject. Nevertheless, I should like to stress once again that we have neglected no aspect of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any part of the world.

However, we should be making a serious mistake if we did not take into consideration the very special importance of this problem to Europe, where the demarcation line between the two most powerful military groupings in the world is situated and where the danger of proliferation is the greatest, because this is where political forces are active which do not wish to renounce the revision of the frontiers established in Europe after the Second World War and which seek to obtain access to atomic weapons at any cost in the hope of thus making their claims successful.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

The defence of the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany is part of the traditional repertoire of the Western delegations. We have even been blamed for not having replied to the so-called peaceful overtures which that Government ventured to address to us. On several occasions the contribution of the Federal Republic of Germany to the solution of the problem of non-proliferation has been praised here. Permit me, therefore, to quote a passage from the Note which the Polish Government addressed on 29 April to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in reply to its Note of 23 March:

"It is not by chance that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, which in its Note states that it is ready to make its contribution to the achievement of progress in the field of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, limits itself to the prohibition of the production of such weapons and to the establishment of national control. In this way the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany fails to mention the prohibition of the proliferation of such weapons through various forms of joint possession within the framework of military alliances and through arrangements and decisions taken jointly for their use.

"It would be difficult to describe such a position as anything but political hypocrisy. Unquestionably, access to nuclear weapons by the Federal Republic of Germany, which that Government has been stubbornly pursuing for years, would cause, regardless of the form under which such access would be gained, a further increase in tension in Europe and would destroy any chance of reaching an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This policy of the Federal Republic of Germany is fraught with dangerous consequences also for its own allies who, whatever their intentions, might find themselves involved in the consequences of a conflict brought about by the Federal Republic of Germany."

Although we have given but little time in our discussions to the problem of general and complete disarmament, the Polish delegation considers that this problem cannot be relegated to the background. We agree with the representative of India, Mr. Trivedi, on this subject.



(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

We also believe that all collateral measures must be considered in the context of what constitutes our basic task -- that is, to reach an agreement in the field of general and complete disarmament. It is because of this point of view that we are particularly concerned with European problems. We are convinced that the establishment of a system of collective security in Europe, and the implementation of the plan for a denuclearized zone and limited armaments in Central Europe (ENDC/C.1/1), or of a more limited plan for a "freeze" on nuclear weapons in this area (ENDC/PV.189, p. 6), could contribute appreciably towards facilitating the achievement of our task.

The Polish delegation considers that we must devote more attention to the question of extending the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) to cover underground nuclear tests. We think that some of the proposals put forward by the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.259) and Sweden (ENDC/PV.256) offer solutions which deserve thorough examination.

The Committee is going to interrupt its work for five weeks, but this period should not be -- and I hope that it will not be -- a pause in the efforts which we are making to find ways that would help us to overcome the difficulties with which we are faced. We should like to hope that the Western delegations will reconsider the positions which they have hitherto adopted and will return to Geneva in June with new and more constructive proposals. For its part, the Polish delegation can assure the Committee that this period of recess will not be a time of rest as far as it is concerned. It will not fail to continue its efforts to contribute to the solution of the very important problems with which we have been entrusted.

Mr. LAHODA (Czechoslovakia): Before we start our recess I should like to make a few observations on the discussions we have had during this session of the Committee. In view of the fact that the Czechoslovak delegation has spoken on all the points on the Committee's agenda and has explained in detail its position on the principal questions I shall limit my remarks to a summary review of the three and a half months of work behind us.

(Mr. Lahoda, Czechoslovakia)

This review is far from pleasing and gives no reason for self-satisfaction. On the contrary, it arouses serious concern and apprehension. We have held twenty-nine meetings, we have heard about 130 statements and we have achieved nothing. We have made no progress on any of the questions discussed; we have not moved forward towards carrying out the terms of reference entrusted to us by the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly since we have not translated into reality the resolutions adopted by it. Winding up our spring session we find ourselves precisely where we stood at its start.

It makes little sense to seek excuses by pointing to the difficulty of the task or even defending such a state of affairs as inevitable, asserting that it is impossible to cut at once the Gordian knot of armaments which mankind has taken thousands of years of its existence to tie. Nothing can justify the fact that, despite clearcut directives and concrete proposals, we have been dragging our feet and have been unable to arrive at a single agreement that would facilitate our drawing nearer to our primary objective -- that is, general and complete disarmament.

The state of our negotiations is highly unsatisfactory and it is impossible to close our eyes to this fact. We are at an impasse on almost all questions both in the field of general and complete disarmament and in the sphere of collateral measures. Our debates have not respected the time aspect, which should limit their endless flow. Despite all efforts on the part of the socialist and non-aligned delegations we cannot count a single asset today; we can but recognize complete stagnation.

The causes of this unsatisfactory state of affairs are not difficult to find. Their roots, as with some tropical plants, are above the surface; they are not hidden from our eyes. As with tropical vegetation, these roots reach far with their ramified offshoots. They grow from the aggressive policies and strategic plans of the United States. These factors make a negative impact on the prospects for our negotiations. It is difficult to do two opposing things at one time. It is illogical to arm and to disarm. When a State wages an unjust, aggressive war and commits open aggression it blocks all that contravenes its designs, all that does not fit into its militaristic concept.

Attempts of certain Powers to strengthen the integration of additional States into their military machinery through sharing of nuclear armaments put a brake on the signing of an effective treaty banning the dissemination of nuclear weapons as demanded by resolution 2028(XX) (ENDC/161). The fixed programme of research on

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these weapons by means of underground explosions feverishly conducted in order to achieve their perfection shifts into the background the question of the absolute prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests. The policy of the United States, which determines the approach of the Western delegations to our negotiations, simply contradicts all we wish to accomplish here.

As a result, disarmament is spoken of but nothing is done to achieve it. On the contrary, the arms race is intensified, the numbers of armed forces to be used in combat against peace-loving peoples are increased. That is why the comprehensive and highly-detailed drafts submitted by the Soviet Union, which enjoy the broad support of world public opinion, have not been accepted by the Western delegations. The Soviet proposals do not harmonize with the global interests which the United States Government tries to pursue.

The use of weapons and force to satisfy the selfish ends of one country or group of countries excludes a positive approach to the problem of disarmament. The representative of Nigeria put it very aptly at our meeting on 5 May when he said:

"We believe that there is a close relationship between the arms race and injustice in some parts of the world. It is hardly worth while preaching the gospel of disarmament when some countries are only too willing to connive at or even encourage acts of injustice by the use or the threat of force." (ENDC/PV.262, p.14)

I believe it is good to keep in mind always the impact of the general international situation on the debates in our Committee. Some delegations of the Western Powers show a tendency to draw a sharp line between what is going on outside this room and our discussions. There is no such dividing wall. We do not sit in a hermetically-sealed laboratory, separated from the outside world, where we cannot hear the explosions of United States bombs dropped day after day on Viet-Nam, the cries of innocent victims, the voice of the suffering population of the attacked country. It is impossible to be isolated from the outside world, to disengage oneself from its problems and to hold an academic discussion on the theory of disarmament. The events taking place in Asia, Europe, Latin America and Africa press heavily on us, willy-nilly. We shall not get rid of them by passing them over in silence. What, then is the sense in showing them the door and describing any reference to them as inadmissible propaganda?

If negative elements are to be eliminated it is necessary first to eliminate the causes bringing them to life, and not to stifle the voices rightly calling them obstacles on the way towards disarmament. It is not correct to put the blame on the

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mirror because it reflects things in their true shape; It is desirable to put a more appropriate object before the mirror so that it may produce a more pleasing and better picture. In other words, the blame for the unsatisfactory international situation does not rest with those who take it into consideration and demand its improvement, but with those who create it.

It is not possible in this Committee to disregard the situation which directly jeopardizes the results of our negotiations. After all, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, himself expressed this view in his speech in Strasbourg on 3 May when he said that the present situation in Viet-Nam now "casts its shadow on all aspects of international co-operation." I have quoted from The New York Times of 4 May. Does anyone think that the Eighteen-Nation Committee, with its agenda, is an exception in this respect; that it stands beyond the shadow?

Many delegations have rightly pointed out that we do not have time to spare and cannot afford to waste it. Each postponement, each delay, may become fatal. Of course it is true that in the circumstances disarmament is not a question to be settled at once, that prerequisites for achieving disarmament must be patiently sought and created, and that measures conducive to the final objective must be implemented systematically. However, that does not mean that we do not need to hurry, that we have nothing to lose, that sooner or later other opportunities will be offered to us to put disarmament proposals into practice. There is a great danger that should we fail to act in time we might be taken by surprise by the very thing we were established to prevent -- that is, by a war which would leave us nothing to disarm. And that is why we are here, so that events shall not be allowed to go that far. That is also one of the reasons why we pay due attention to the general situation and to developments in individual parts of the world.

In this connexion we cannot but wonder why some specific measures aimed at enhancing the security of States and consolidating international stability or increasing confidence in some parts of the world -- as is the case with the proposed non-aggression pact between the States signatories of the Warsaw Pact and the States members of NATO (ENDC/77) -- are constantly rejected by the Western delegations, citing ideological reasons, among others. Does that mean that, in order to be able to reach agreement on individual measures proposed for the purpose of achieving a relaxation of international tensions, we must first abandon our respective ideologies? If that were so, of course, we could not sit here and discuss a single

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proposal; no agreement would then be possible between members of the two alliances. Nor would the non-aligned States, many of which were born as a result of their national liberation struggle and naturally support that just movement, be qualified to take part in similar negotiations.

We believe that the condition for our success is respect for the principle of the full sovereign equality of all the parties involved, irrespective of their State and social systems and official ideologies. Our objective is not to persuade our partners here to renounce their ideology but to make a positive contribution to disarmament, to safeguarding the peace and security of nations. That is how we see the sense of our work.

In conclusion, I should like to underline the fact that the term given to us for the fulfilment of our task grows mercilessly shorter. All that we have failed to do makes future developments difficult. The detailed and realistic proposals whose usefulness and currency are being impartially tested by present times await translation into life. They cannot be regarded in the same way as wine, which tastes better the older it gets. Therefore it is necessary that the Western delegations review their approach to the questions under discussion and in future negotiations adopt a position which will facilitate our reaching agreement.

I should like to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and his colleagues as well as the other members of the Secretariat for the excellent services extended to us, which have smoothed the course of the past session.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): I had not intended to take up much of the time of the Committee today. However, we have heard a statement from the representative of the Soviet Union which again tended to narrow down the issues of non-proliferation to the question whether or not the Federal Republic of Germany is to have what the Soviet Union and its allies describe as "access" to nuclear weapons. At our meeting on 5 May Lord Chalfont, the representative of the United Kingdom, criticized this attitude and pointed out its effects (ENDC/PV.262, p.5). We have heard some comments this morning from the representative of the Soviet Union in reply to Lord Chalfont. If there is anything to be added in regard to this particular line of controversy, the representative of the United Kingdom is very capable of adding it. However, in view of what has been said, our delegation feels that it is necessary once again to make clear the Canadian viewpoint on this attitude of the delegations of the Eastern European nations here towards the Federal Republic of Germany.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The Canadian Government deplores the suggestions of the delegations of the Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe that the posture of the Federal Republic of Germany constitutes an obstacle in the way of a non-proliferation agreement. In making such charges our colleagues appear to be introducing an issue deliberately calculated to impede progress on a non-proliferation treaty and to realize limited political objectives vis-à-vis their Western neighbours. Our task in **this** Committee is to produce agreements on disarmament, and one of our most immediate and vital objectives is a non-proliferation treaty. The Federal Republic of Germany has subscribed to this objective both by renouncing atomic, bacteriological and chemical weapons under the Declaration of the Nine-Power London Conference of 1954 -- which was subsequently included in a protocol of the Brussels Treaty -- and by espousing the principle of a non-proliferation treaty.

This was reaffirmed by Chancellor Erhard in his statement to the Bundestag on 10 November last, when he said:

"The Federal German Republic in 1954 gave a voluntary undertaking to its allies to renounce the production of atomic, bacteriological and chemical weapons on its territory. We would welcome it if as many other countries as possible were to follow that German example. With this pledge we fulfilled, eleven years ago, the essential element of any treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We have repeatedly made known that we do not desire national control of nuclear weapons. The Federal Government has at all times regarded general and complete disarmament as one of its principal objectives. We reaffirm this once again and declare our willingness to support all these international endeavours which bring the world closer to this aim".

I would also refer the Committee to the Note of 25 March of the Federal Republic of Germany, which was delivered to all Governments represented at this Conference and which made some very constructive proposals in the sphere of non-proliferation and other aspects of disarmament and European security.

I was rather disappointed to hear, in the speech made today by the representative of Poland, the reply which the Polish Government has apparently made to these constructive proposals. I must also say that I was not very happy to hear the statement that was made by the representative of Czechoslovakia, which dealt to a great extent with the conditions in Viet-Nam. It is quite true, as he said, that we here cannot disregard the conflicts which are going on in various parts of the world.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

But he used the simile of a mirror which reflects objects in their true shape, and I would say this. No one can complain of a mirror which truly reflects the objects presented to it. But if a distorting mirror is held up to these objects, a mirror which shows rays coming from only one direction, that is not very helpful in enabling us to get ahead with our task in this Committee of trying to find ways in which we can agree to reduce armaments and thereby lessen the dangers of conflict in the world.

In closing, and perhaps on a more agreeable note, I should like to echo the concluding portions of the speeches that were made today, in which we were all urged to reconsider our positions and to come back here on 14 June with some new proposals or modifications of old proposals which can bring agreement.

I should also like to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and all the United Nations staff here who are so necessary to our work and who have carried out their tasks so very well.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): I should like to join the representatives of Czechoslovakia and Canada in thanking, on behalf of the Committee, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, his Deputy and all the other members of the Secretariat who have so efficiently assisted us during this session.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 263rd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Francesco Cavalletti, representative of Italy.

"Statements were made by the representatives of India, the United States, the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Canada.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 14 June 1966, at 3 p.m."

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

